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The elite character, development and type of 
capitalism  
Slovenia and Estonia in a comparative perspective 
Frane Adam, Matevž Tomšič and Primož Kristan 
The composition of the elite in transition countries 
One characteristic of post-socialist political elites is their heterogeneity. Namely, 
they are made up of individuals and groups with various social and historical origins 
and ideological orientations: former dissidents with diverse roots, more or less 
reformist members of the ex-communist nomenclature, members of professional 
groups (so-called technocrats), people from the sphere of the Church and even 
some members of pre-war political elites.1 According to Agh, the transitional politi-
cal elite possesses a number of common characteristics such as its distance from the 
non-elite and a lack of professionalism. For this reason, society perceives it as a 
unified actor which »monopolises politics and exerts control over all social life« 
(Agh 1996: 45). But several antagonisms and conflicts exist among the various elite 
segments, especially the competition for control over key resources which the ac-
tors are trying to obtain through different social linkages (the search for allies, 
various ›coalitions‹); all of this means we are not dealing with a uniform group. 
The social conditions in the countries of the former communist bloc are largely 
characterised by the relationship between so-called old and new elites; id est, between elites 
derived from the ranks of the former regime and the relatively heterogeneous elites 
formed during the process of system transition. It must, however, be stressed that it 
is often difficult to make a clear-cut division between the old and new elites. Even 
the former nomenclature has in fact experienced various transformations and part 
of it has embraced (at least formally) democratic principles and norms, thus the 
thought and action patterns which are essentially a relic of the former undemocratic 
system are often found in recently-founded political parties. 
Nevertheless, a key question of post-socialist transformations concerns the 
position and role of the former holders of monopolistic social power such as the 
members of former communist elites: in other words, whether and to what extent 
—————— 
 1  Attila Agh defines five characteristic transitional types of politician: politicians of morality, politi-
cians of historical vision, politicians of coincidence, the old nomenclature and the emerging profes-
sional political elite. For more details, see Agh (1996). 
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they were able to retain key social resources and thereby continue to influence the 
development of these societies. In view of this, there are two interpretations of 
post-socialist conditions. The theory of elite reproduction holds that changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe did not have an impact on the composition of elites 
since the nomenclature was able to stay at the top of the social structure and 
become the new grand bourgeoisie. According to Hankiss (1990), the communist 
elites (at least their ›reformed‹ parts) used their political capital to acquire economic 
assets (through processes like ›spontaneous privatisation‹). During the transition 
process, the nomenclature managed to stay in its positions because it succeeded in a 
particular rapid conversion (Matonyte/Mink 2003). The socio-economic structure 
of post-communist societies is thus argued to be designed according to the needs of 
this elite, described in terms like ›political capitalism‹ (Staniszkis 1991) or ›crony 
capitalism‹ (Hanley 2000). According to the theory of elite circulation, however, 
these transformations are brought about by structural changes at the top of the 
social hierarchy, id est, the key positions occupied by new people on the basis of new 
principles (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995: 616).  
Yet in some interpretations the findings of empirical research do not catego-
rically corroborate either the theory of reproduction or the theory of circulation (see 
Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995: 636).2 It is evident that in the process of post-socialist 
transition no revolutionary changes occurred in this region in general. Thus, part of 
the old elite – mainly its bureaucratic faction – left the elite, although a large part of 
the elite of the late 1980s retained their key positions. On the other hand, a large 
share of post-socialist elites is made up of people who did not belong to the 
nomenclature. However, with these new members usually no great ›structural shifts‹ 
occurred since most of them came from the ranks of professionals and mid-level 
bureaucracy, id est, those who at the end of the 1980s wielded at least some power 
(ibid.: 622–624). 
The reproduction of elites in Russia is understandable since the social changes 
in that country occurred more slowly, were less fundamental and no strong counter-
elite had existed that could have pushed the communist party personnel out. Thus, 
—————— 
 2  A lengthy international comparative study of national elites (which formed part of the research pro-
ject ›Social Stratification in Eastern Europe‹) was conducted in several countries of the post-socialist 
transition in the 1990 to 94 period. It was carried out by Ivan Szelenyi and his colleagues and initia-
ted in 1990. By mid-1994, surveys had been completed in six countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Russia. During 1993 and 1994, they conducted interviews with 
approximately 40.000 respondents. In each country, they interviewed 2.000 elite members: 1,000 of 
them were in nomenclature positions in 1988, 600 were members of the 1993 economic elite, and 
400 were members of the 1993 political or cultural elite. In addition, a comparative sample of 5.000 
randomly selected members of the entire population was taken in each country. By the end of 1993, 
data were available for three countries: Hungary, Poland and Russia. Some articles based on that 
data were published in Theory and Society, vol. 24: 5 (1995) (special issue). 
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in the conditions of relative social instability, where democratic institutions do not 
function properly, communist party personnel have the advantage over the new 
players. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, the principle of the circulation of elites 
holds greater weight.3 This can be accounted for by the relatively well-developed 
civil societies there (in comparison to Russia) and a strong political counter-elite, 
which defeated the former communists in the first free elections. 
A research study of the profile of the national elite was also conducted in the 
Czech Republic. The results indicate that in terms of the economic elite the level of 
reproduction is quite high, while in terms of political, administrative and cultural 
elites we can speak of circulation (Srubar 1998).4 One should also mention here a 
comparative study of national elites carried out in the Baltic countries which 
concludes that with the Baltic elites there is a combination of continuity and change. 
Here, Anton Steen, the author of the study, uses the term ›elite recirculation‹ (Steen 
1997).5 
It is thus evident that the configuration of national elites, meaning the relative 
position and size of various elite circles in the constellation of power (Dogan 2003a: 
1), differs considerably from one post-socialist country to another, and the same is 
true for the balance between the reproduction and circulation of elites. It is pre-
cisely the balance and relations among the recently emerged factions of the post-
socialist elite that decisively determine the character of political regimes (primarily in 
—————— 
 3  Wasilewski’s 1998 study of the current Polish elite (573 interviews were conducted with representa-
tives of political, administrative and economic elites) gives somewhat different results in terms of the 
reproduction of the Polish elite: among the new elite, supposedly over a quarter (27  per cent) of 
those belonged to the elite during the communist rule. According to the author, this share represents 
a »significant reproduction of the old elite« (Wasilewski 1999: 4). 
 4  40 percent of the Czech transitional economic elite occupied elite positions before 1989. Of these 40 
percent, 85 percent were ex-communist party members, while 57 percent of the new economic elite 
were former communist party members (the percentage of ›party members‹ in the economic elite is 
considerably greater than the percentages in the political and cultural elites). In current managerial 
structures, only 23 percent of managers in fact held general manager positions before 1989, how-
ever, 50 percent of them were at that time deputy general managers or members of the board of 
directors (id est, they belonged to some kind of second-rank managerial staff). 30 percent of the cul-
tural elite held elite positions during communism. The results are similar in the case of the political 
elite, thus displaying a relatively low level of continuity. 35 percent of the members of the new poli-
tical elite used to be communist party members (Srubar 1998). 
 5  The proportion of the elites who were members of the Communist Party and who held high posi-
tions in the former regime are: 55 percent in Latvia, 54 percent in Estonia and in 44 percent Lithua-
nia (Steen 1997: 158). One reason for the smaller proportion of ex-Communist Party members in 
new Lithuanian elites may lie in the more pronounced left-right political cleavage (which has stimu-
lated a more critical focus on the past), while in the case of the other two countries ethnic cleavages 
between the indigenous and Russophone populations were prevalent. In Estonia and Latvia, an 
intensive De-Russification of the elites occurred, meaning that the ethnicity of candidates for elite 
positions was more important than their political background. 
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terms of the division of power in society, id est, the level of its dispersal or concen-
tration, as well as in terms of the social order as a whole). The types of elites in 
post-socialist societies differ from one another in a similar way as do the configura-
tions of elites. The character of a political system in fact depends largely on the type 
of relations among the various political elites (Field et al 1990; Higley/ Burton 
1998). This is particularly true in the case of a system transformation in which elites 
play the role of institution-builders (Kaminski/Kurczewska 1994). In their classi-
fication, Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski specify four types of political elites on the 
basis of two factors: the level of integration and differentiation of elites: consensual, 
fragmented, divided and ideocratic elites.6 In countries with a consensual elite 
(Visegrad countries, Baltic countries, Slovenia) where all the key political players 
abide by the rules and where a relative balance of power between different factions 
of political elite exists, the entrenchment of long-term political stability is most 
likely. However, in most countries of the former Soviet Union, of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and in Albania, where there is 
practically no consensus on the fundamental norms of political activity, a specific 
part of the political elite is explicitly dominant. Accordingly, the chances of success-
ful political transformation, meaning the establishment of a stable polyarchical 
democracy (as well as the reforming of the remaining societal spheres), are relatively 
small, at least in the near future.  
However, it should be pointed out that consensus and quasi-solidarity among 
political elites could lead to clientelism and the irresponsibility for national develop-
ment on the part of these elites. There are even some examples from developed 
Western democracies that testify to this. The problem is not only a lack of elite inte-
gration but also the elite overlapping and interlocking or even a colonisation of the 
elite sector by one of its sectors.7 It enhances elitism in the sense of a lack of res-
ponsiveness and responsibility towards the citizens. The convergence between poli-
tical and civil society elites, coupled with a missing link between leaders and the 
masses in both politics and civil society which is, some say, characteristic of post-
communist societies (Korkut 2005) hampers the development of democratic politi-
cal lifeland a vibrant civil sphere. In this light, the relationship between consensus, 
conflict and competition should be re-defined. 
The majority of research on elites in post-socialist societies has generally been of 
a descriptive nature and focused on formal positions and characteristics (Bozoki 
—————— 
 6  For detailed information on their conceptualisation, see Higley et al 1998. 
 7  In France, researchers stress the central role of the bureaucratic faction of the national elite which 
dominates not only political life but sometimes even the business sphere since people from the top 
of the state administration frequently assume positions of CEOs in big companies (Dogan 2003b). 
Some signs of the bureaucratisation of big business are also observed in Germany (Scheuch 2003), 
indicating the growing role of political and administrative elites.  
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2003). At the same time, it offers empirical evidence for further elaboration and 
stimulates criticism and new investigations. Our review of the evidence on the for-
mation and dynamics of positional elites in post-socialist societies clearly indicates 
there is neither pure reproduction nor pure circulation, but we can speak of a grea-
ter inclination to one or other form in these countries. For the cases of Slovenia, the 
most economically developed, and Estonia, the fastest developing, post-communist 
country we will seek to define these mixed forms more precisely, for example, the 
relations between reproduction and circulation, and their consequences for moder-
nisation8 and socio-economic development. 
Elites and political dynamics: a comparison of Slovenia and 
Estonia 
Besides being former communist countries, Slovenia and Estonia share several simi-
lar characteristics. First, they are both small countries in terms of the size of their 
territory and number of inhabitants. Second, they are new countries that gained 
independence only after the collapse of communist regimes. (In the case of Estonia, 
independence was, in fact, regained since it was a sovereign country in the period 
between two World Wars.) Third, they were the most economically developed 
regions in former multi-national settings (although Slovenia was at the considerably 
higher level in this regard) with the most Western contacts due to their geographical 
closeness to Western Europe: Slovenia borders Austria and Italy and Estonia has a 
maritime border with Finland.  
However, the nature of the communist regimes in these two countries differed 
considerably in some aspects. The Slovenian regime was, in general, much more 
open and Slovenia enjoyed more regional autonomy, while with Estonia the oppres-
siveness of the Soviet regime remained strong up until the beginning of perestroika 
and Estonians were exposed to a severe process of Russification – the result of 
which was about one-third of Estonia’s population inhabited with Russian-speaking 
people (who mostly settled during the Soviet period) at the time of establishing the 
country’s independence.  
—————— 
 8  Here we understand modernisation as a complex process of social changes in various fields (politics, 
the economy, science etc.) in the function of catching up with the so-called developmental core, 
meaning those states perceived to be the most developed. From the viewpoint of post-socialist 
states, such a referential framework mainly comprises the most developed member states of the 
European Union. 
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The two new EU members, despite the abovementioned similarities, experienced 
different dynamics of their systemic transformation. They established varying types 
of socio-economic regulation and different institutional settings which consequently 
determined the results of the transition process. Our analysis intends to show how 
these differences were determined partly by the logic of ›path-dependence‹, in other 
words, the conditions at the start of the transition process as well as by the character 
of the main actors, namely the elites, especially political ones, the relations between 
them and their strategic choices. In the following part of the text, we will briefly 
outline political developments in both countries in the post-communist period, the 
elite configurations and their consequences for socio-economic development.  
Slovenia 
The Slovenian political space is characterised by a bipolar division into two political 
blocs. The first is the so-called ›left-liberal‹ and the second the so-called ›right‹ bloc, 
with neither being fully internally homogeneous. They can be most clearly divided 
regarding their institutional origins. The main two parties of the first camp – the 
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and the Social Democrats (SD) (until 2005 
the United List of Social Democrats) have their organisational roots in the old 
(socialist) regime – the latter is the successor to the former ruling Communist 
Party.9 The other bloc consists of three main parties – the Slovenian Democratic 
Party (SDS) which is the dominant party here, the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) 
and New Slovenia (NSi) – which were established during the process of democrati-
sation. The distinction between the ›old‹ and ›new‹ parties as they are often labelled 
in public discourse largely covers the left-right cleavage (›left‹ as the ›old‹ and ›right‹ 
as the ›new‹ parties).10 At first, the cleavage mostly referred to the positions of both 
camps in the past, meaning both the period between the two world wars and the 
—————— 
 9  It has to be mentioned that the LDS acquired some special features. Regarding the origin of its 
membership it is quite a heterogeneous party. Its dominant core originates from the former Socialist 
Youth Organisation which, in the second half of the 1980s, became even more critical of the regime; 
it can be said that it was an opposition within the (communist) party and its members had contacts 
with dissident circles (opposition outside the communist party). In 1994, a small but very significant 
section of members of two parties from the new political elite (members of the Demos coalition 
that governed from 1990 to 1992) joined the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia. 
 10  The labelling of both political blocs as ›the left‹ (first camp) and ›the right‹ (second camp) which is 
common in public discourse has been a paradox for a long time (and to some extent it has blurred 
the picture of the Slovenian political space) since members of the business elite belong to propo-
nents of ›the left‹, mostly the LDS, while many of those who considered themselves de-privileged 
(which is often described in terms of injustices suffered under the communist regime) have sup-
ported ›the right‹. 
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communist period as well as to some other positions of a symbolic and ideological 
nature like the role of religion and the Catholic Church in society. (In this regard, 
the ›left‹ takes a quite lenient attitude to the communist period while it is sceptical 
and not rejective of the public engagement of the Church, while the ›right‹ is 
strongly critical of communism yet relatively supportive of the Church.) While this 
›cultural war‹ still has some potential for political mobilisation (although it has decli-
ned in the last few years), the issue of socio-economic regulation is gaining in 
importance and becoming the main point of controversy since the new govern-
ment, mostly comprising parties of the ›right‹, launched a comprehensive program-
me of social and economic reforms directed at liberalisation and de-etatisation that 
should enhance the competitiveness and innovativeness of the Slovenian economy 
and society at large. These reforms are encountering considerable reluctance on the 
part of the opposition (especially the LDS) which warns against an increase in social 
inequality and the impoverishment of a considerable share of the population – mea-
ning it is demonstrating its ›leftist nature‹ in terms of its social orientation and 
scepticism of ›unleashed‹ capitalism. 
The victory of the ›right‹ in the last parliamentary elections (in 2004) brought a 
major change in the constellation of political forces. For the most of the post-com-
munist period, the Slovenian political space was dominated by a ›left-liberal‹ bloc in 
which the LDS played a central part. From the first parliamentary elections in 1990 
onwards, there were five ›political turns‹ (including the establishment of the first 
non-communist government in 1990, and the current one), in other words, changes 
of the political options in power (and five different heads of government, including 
the current one). However, in this (14-year) period governments not dominated by 
›left-liberal‹ parties were in place for just two and a half years. Although all LDS-led 
governments were composed of parties from different camps, this party dominated 
them and ›spring parties‹ only played a marginal role in these coalitions.  
The political domination of the ›left-liberal‹ bloc was strongly related to the 
configuration of the general elite in post-communist Slovenia. Research conducted 
in 1995 on Slovenian functional elites in politics, culture and the business sector11 
provided some data on the relations between the old (people who occupied high 
positions before 1988 and were able to preserve them) and the new elites (those 
assuming elite positions after 1988). In fact, this showed a fairly high level of repro-
—————— 
 11  It should be stated that, regarding the research on elites in Slovenia carried out in 1995, a positional 
determination of the elites was performed. In this context, individuals are part of an elite if they 
occupy key positions in three main social areas: in politics (e.g. ministers, representatives in parlia-
ment, high state administrators, party leaders), in the economy (managers in leading companies) and 
in the cultural sphere (leading staff in cultural and scientific institutions, media establishments and 
professional associations). 
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duction in all elite sectors (the highest in the business sector),12 much higher than in 
other comparable Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) where the change in the regime resulted in fundamental changes to the elite 
positions and thus the circulation of elites was higher. The consequence was that 
the vast majority of the elite gravitated (regarding its voting preferences) towards 
the political part of the retention elite, represented by the LDS and SD. This faction 
of the political elite had much better connections with various strategic groups wit-
hin society, above all the management, business and academic sphere, the social 
sciences circles and the media. Its advantage thus lay in its intellectual and cadre 
potential as well as financial resources, which led to its disproportionate influence 
and informal power within society. This informal power contributed to the domi-
nance of ›the left‹ more than their legitimate power, id est support among the popu-
lation, since both the blocs were more or less in balance until the last parliamentary 
elections in 2000. 
Estonia 
The political space in post-communist Estonia has been characterised by the fact 
that, unlike in most other Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hunga-
ry, Slovenia, Lithuania), the former communist elite did not manage to politically 
survive, at least not in the form of a strong communist successor party. Moreover, 
there is no strong left in Estonian political life. Among the political parties currently 
represented in parliament, only one – the smallest of six parliamentary parties (the 
Social Democratic Party, the former People’s Party Moderates) – may be considered 
as centre-leftist-oriented.13 The others are labelled centrist or centre-rightist.14 This 
means that it is mostly liberal and conservative forces competing for political sup-
—————— 
 12  The rate of reproduction amounts on average to 77 percent, with the highest individual level being 
in the business sector (84  per cent) and the lowest in politics (66 per cent), while in culture it 
reaches 78 percent (Kramberger 1998, 1999; Iglič/Rus 2000). 
 13  But even the orientation of this party seems to bear some traits of the New Labour (Lagerspetz/ 
Vogt 2004: 65) and is thus not similar to the classical social-democratic parties.  
 14 The Centre Party received the highest number of votes in the last parliamentary election and is label-
led by some as ›left leaning‹ (Pettai 2004: 993). However, it is a member of the European Liberal, 
Democratic and Reform Party. The Estonian People’s Union is also sometimes described as a ›left 
of centre‹ party, which refers to its more left-oriented (by Estonian standards) social and economics 
policies advocating more state regulation and subsidising. However, in cultural terms it is conser-
vatively oriented, proclaiming national and traditional values. This demonstrates how difficult it is 
for many post-communist parties to be located in the categories of ›left‹ and ›right‹. As observed by 
some political analysts, the classical left-right cleavage has not yet evolved in Estonian political life 
(Grofman et al 2001).  
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port and an exchange in positions of political power. (However, at the elections for 
the European Parliament in 2004 the Social Democrats won the largest share of 
votes, which might indicate a certain change in the configuration of the Estonian 
political space).  
Estonian political life has been characterised by high political dynamics in terms 
of the frequent changes of power-holders. Since 1990 there have been eleven 
governments and eight different people have headed up the government (the lon-
gest duration of government was three years – between 1999 and 2002 when it was 
led by Mart Laar). Most governments have been centre-rightist-oriented. Only one 
Prime Minister can be declared a social democrat (Andres Tarand, then not a party 
affiliate but who later led the Moderates) but even the government he led was not 
left-centre-oriented in general due to the fact that the coalition parties come from 
centrist and centre-rightist political options.  
It is obvious that Estonian politics is, notwithstanding the quite frequent change 
of governments, dominated by a conservative-liberal option (Vogt 2003). This rela-
tes to the configuration of elites which has experienced the considerable circulation 
of the key positions. The circulation was, as mentioned before, not very ›deep‹ mea-
ning that (mostly the younger) people recruited to the elite positions have not been 
complete newcomers since they occupied positions of some importance even at the 
end of the communist period (Steen 1997; Steen/Ruus 2002).15 However, this 
influences the ideological composition of the political sphere and society at large 
since the vast majority of them embrace a neo-liberal ideology. 
Although Estonia has had, at least in the first years of its independence, consi-
derable continuity in terms of the communist pedigree of the political elite, this has 
not had an impact on the rightist character of the political space.16 One of the 
authors, on the other side, in his recent study argues that the elites‹ strong rightist 
orientations are levelling out or even declining (Steen 2007).17 What is surprising 
—————— 
 15  As stated by Steen, »While the nomenclature was largely removed from power, the younger, well 
educated, mid-level leaders from the former regime are continuing and are now occupying most of 
the top positions« (Steen 1997: 166). 
 16  As stated by Ruus and Taru in their study on members of the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament): »A 
majority of all Estonian MPs have right-wing orientations, and consequently, their previous mem-
bership of the Communist Party has only a minor impact on leftist attitudes« (Ruus/Taru 2003: 67). 
 17  In a study of elites’ beliefs and economic reforms in the Baltic states and Russia (280–315 face-to-
face interviews of top leaders – parliamentary deputies, administrative officials, directors of major 
private companies and state enterprises, NGO leaders, the judiciary, culture institutions and local 
government – were conducted in every state and combined with the World Bank and IMF statistical 
material), Steen comes to the conclusion that »(…) the elites’ rightist orientations were strong during 
the initial phase of reforms and are fairly stable during the 1994-2003 period. The elite support for 
private ownership was extremely high in the beginning among all elite groups but is apparently decli-
ning gradually as the effects of capitalism, e.g. income inequality hits population. The state option 
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here is the notion that the state option for resolving traditional collective problems 
found strong support among all elite groups in the period between 1994 and 2003. 
Considering Estonia’s low healthcare expenditure and its falling rate of total expen-
diture on social protection, a return to the state option seems very unlikely.18 In 
fact, even political parties belonging to the left side of the Estonian political spec-
trum are clearly pro-market, so much so that in many countries they might qualify 
as steadfast right-wingers (Vogt 2003: 83). The change in ideological affiliation also 
occurred to some top functionaries of the former regime. A typical example is 
Arnold Ruutel, the current president of the republic who was the last president of 
the Supreme Soviet of Estonia but later became a leading figure of one new political 
party (Estonian People’s Union) that claims to represent national-conservative valu-
es. Evidently the position in the former regime’s power structure did not determine 
ideological preferences in the post-communist situation as happened in some other 
countries like Slovenia.  
The politico-ideological hegemony and its consequences 
One could say that both Slovenia and Estonia have for most of the post-communist 
period been characterised by politico-ideological hegemony. What differs is the con-
tent and bearer of this hegemony. While in Slovenia it was undertaken by a ›leftist-
liberal‹ camp (Adam/Tomsic 2002) and oriented to maintaining the status quo, in 
Estonia it was conducted by a conservative-liberal option and directed at radical 
change in the sense of the liberalisation of society (Lagerspetz 2001; Lagerspetz/ 
Vogt 2004). Hegemony in Slovenia was maintained in conditions of a bipolar 
structure of the political space, despite the fact that the electoral support for both 
camps was often quite in balance, mainly through informal elite networks. Hegemo-
ny in Estonia was, despite the absence of a dominant political entity and the relative 
fragmentation of the political space, maintained through a wide value and policy 
consensus of the main political actors.  
—————— 
for solving traditional collective problems has strong support among all elite groups during the enti-
re period« (Steen 2007: 96). 
 18  Regarding healthcare expenditure, in 2003 Estonia with 4.2 percent of GDP was only placed higher 
than Lithuania (3.9) and Latvia (3.0). Slovenia, for example, spent almost twice as much (7.8), while 
other figures are Czech Republic (7.1), Hungary (6.2), Slovakia (5.8) and Poland (4.3). The total 
expenditure on social protection in Estonia decreased from 14.4 percent of GDP in 2000, 13.6 
percent of GDP in 2001, 13.2 percent of GDP in 2002 to 13.4 percent of GDP in 2003 (Source: 
Eurostat Yearbook 2006–07). 
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It seems that the presence of an ›external threat‹ in the form of Russia as a strong 
neighbour and former oppressor as well as the large Russophone population acted 
as a homogeniser of Estonian elites on the basis of a national and neo-liberal 
ideological platform. In the case of Slovenia, the absence of such a strong ongoing 
threat (despite the fact that its Ex-Yugoslav neighbours were at war) prevented such 
homogenisation. Instead, the so-called ›soft transition‹ with the important role of 
the ›old‹ elite which managed to stay in many key positions in society, combined 
with traditions of strong ideological polarisation, maintained the state of a bipolar 
constellation and the domination of one political bloc.  
The composition of Slovenian elites and dynamics of the political space have 
been the subject of dispute among scholars. Some consider this situation to be 
unproblematic, stressing the benign effect of elite reproduction, especially political 
and social stability – Slovenia experienced less social turbulence than any other tran-
sition country – while at the same time relativising the significance of the data indi-
cates a high level of elite continuity (Iglič/Rus 2000; Kramberger/Vehovar 2000) or 
attributing that to the positive role of the old communist elite in the democratisa-
tion process (Miheljak/Toš 2005). However, other more critical interpretations 
exist, including those advocated by the authors of this article (Adam/Tomsic 2000, 
2002; Tomsic 2002). According to them, the high level of elite reproduction is pro-
ducing a long-term malignant effect (although this might not be apparent in the 
short term), including a possible shift towards an oligarchic democracy or delegative 
democracy (see O’Donnell 1998), and the establishment of monopolies and rent-
seeking behaviour. 
Similarly, assessments of Estonian political development are not univocal. It is 
generally accepted that the country achieved great progress in the last fifteen years 
in terms of the development of its economy, society and political life. The tempo of 
its systemic modernisation is probably the fastest in the region and is thus often 
labelled the ›model pupil‹ of the applicants for EU accession (Smith 2002). For this 
achievement, the political actors in this period certainly deserve credit. In spite of 
this, certain observers detect some considerable deficiencies characterising Estonian 
politics and society like increasing social inequality, political egotism and a lack of 
responsibility, widespread clientelism etc.19 The main problem perceived is the elitist 
behaviour of political leaders and their insensitivity to the interests and preferences 
of ordinary people.20 The differing experience of certain social and ethnic groups 
—————— 
 19  In April 2001, a group of Estonian social researchers addressed the public in an appeal raising their 
concerns about the course of the country’s development. In their view, Estonia had drifted into a 
political, social and ethical crisis. They described the notion of »Two Estonias, which symbolise a 
wide gap between power elite and disempowered ordinary citizens« (Lagerspetz/Vogt 2004: 57). 
 20  This elite-centeredness, based on the principles of speed, efficiency and expertise, is argued to also 
be characteristic of the process of Estonia’s integration into the European Union (Raik 2002). 
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results in polarised assessments of the democratic process in terms of their satisfac-
tion with the state of democracy (Evans/Lipsmeyer 2001). 
The specific configurations of the Slovenian and Estonian elites led to gradual 
changes and a high degree in continuity in the first case and to changes of great 
speed and depth in the second. Slovenia managed to avoid abrupt social tensions 
that could have resulted from a big increase in the inequality and impoverishment 
of larger segments of the population. It achieved a relatively high quality of life as 
indicated by, for example, the Human Development Index. In the meantime, the 
high elite reproduction related to excessive political control over key areas and the 
marginalisation of alternative options (not only in the political sphere) led to gro-
wing inertia and staggering systemic reforms resulting in the low efficiency of the 
government and shrinking competitiveness of the economy (as indicated by low 
rankings in surveys like the World Competitiveness Yearbook and the Global Com-
petitiveness Index). Estonia became the fastest growing former-communist country. 
Different comparative surveys see Estonian state/political institutions as being the 
most efficient and development-oriented (especially in terms of providing a busi-
ness-friendly environment) in the region. But this happened at the expense of exclu-
ding certain segments of the population, which resulted in their frustration and 
cynicism. It is obvious that political hegemony, regardless of its ideological basis, 
produces some problematic effects for the proper functioning of a democracy, since 
it leads to the self-sufficiency of power-holders and a lack of responsiveness 
towards the citizenry, in turn generating their distrust of political institutions and, at 
worst, of the system as such.  
Conclusion: different elites, different types of capitalism 
The course of political development and systemic transition is determined to some 
extent by ›path-dependence‹. After the breakdown of the Soviet regime, Estonia 
faced serious socio-economic conditions. They had a choice: to either stay trapped 
in a vicious circle of under-achievement at the Western periphery or to do some-
thing to break this circle and make a developmental breakthrough. Slovenia’s situa-
tion was quite different. Its relative openness towards the West and its more 
market-oriented economy together with some degree of political and especially 
cultural autonomy (which was not the case in the Baltic countries) during the times 
of socialist Yugoslavia made the change in the socio-economic formation less trau-
matic. This led to the prevalence of a notion of the relative compatibility of the 
Slovenian institutional setting with the West which rejected a deep and sudden 
break with the past, arguing for a ›soft transition‹, in other words, piecemeal and 
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gradual institutional changes in order to preserve social stability. This soft transition 
was strongly connected with the abovementioned high elite reproduction, meaning 
that most old communist-era elites retained their positions under the new circum-
stances. However, the political actors still had to make their choices. The Estonian 
elite decided to modernise society through a widespread and rapid liberalisation and 
deregulation, while the Slovenian one embraced a gradualist approach that led to 
much slower and more cautious reforms. 
Both transition models have proved to be successful. Estonia is considered to 
be the fastest-developing state that is rapidly approaching the EU average. Slovenia, 
on the other hand, has succeeded in maintaining the highest GDP in the region – 
despite having lower economic growth than Estonia – and economic stability, 
which enabled the acceptance of the common European currency – Euro (beco-
ming the only new EU member state to do so). Here, two key factors need to be 
mentioned. The first refers to the structural, particularly historical and geo-political 
circumstances (path-dependence). The second has a ›subjective‹ nature and largely 
depends on the decisions and composition of elite groups. Our thesis is that the 
type of capitalism in both states needs to be explained within this context. In the 
case of Slovenia managerial capitalism with a strong (significant) role of the govern-
ment evolved, while in Estonia we can observe the emergence of classical (market) 
capitalism with only a small (marginal) role of the state. Whereas in Slovenia we can 
speak of a ›corporatist welfare state‹ when it comes to Estonia one can at most 
observe a ›residual welfare state‹ and a minimum state. What is interesting is that the 
Estonian elite did not take the nearby Scandinavian model of restricted capitalism 
and universal welfare state as a reference. The social order that emerged is thus 
much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model of entrepreneurship, free-market ideology 
and the limited role of the state. 
However, the story of elites and capitalism in both states is not over yet. Recent 
events and observations tell us that Estonia went too far in the neo-liberal direction, 
while Slovenia exaggeratedly leaned in the corporatist direction. In the former the 
reforms were quick and ruthless while in the latter they were too slow. Estonia’s 
›pure‹ or liberal type of capitalism introduced significant social inequalities, poverty 
and the exclusion of quite large social groups (mostly the Russophone minority). It 
is true that in Slovenia shifts in social stratification also occurred but a much more 
significant problem hindering the »meritocratic« principles and economic competiti-
veness seems to be the rigidity of the labour market and taxation system. Slovenia’s 
new right-centre-oriented government has triggered some liberal reforms however 
they have been cautiously implemented. In Estonia a segment of the political elite 
has already started to consider a bigger role for the state (Steen 2007). In addition, 
we can detect the importance of the social learning factor of elites that, along with 
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path-dependence and the elites‹ creative responses to historical and geo-political 
limitations, is significantly influencing the course and quality of social development.  
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